8u131 Update Release Notes
April 18, 2017
Java™ SE Development Kit 8, Update 131 (JDK 8u131)
The full version string for this update release is 1.8.0_131-b11 (where "b" means "build"). The version number is 8u131.
IANA Data 2016j
JDK 8u131 contains IANA time zone data version 2016j. For more information, refer to Timezone Data Versions in the JRE Software.
Security Baselines
The security baselines for the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) at the time of the release of JDK 8u131 are specified in the following table:
| JRE Family Version | JRE Security Baseline (Full Version String) |
|---|---|
| 8 | 1.8.0_131-b11 |
| 7 | 1.7.0_141-b11 |
| 6 | 1.6.0_151-b10 |
JRE Expiration Date
The JRE expires whenever a new release with security vulnerability fixes becomes available. Critical patch updates, which contain security vulnerability fixes, are announced one year in advance on Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Third Party Bulletin. This JRE (version 8u131) will expire with the release of the next critical patch update scheduled for July 18, 2017.
For systems unable to reach the Oracle Servers, a secondary mechanism expires this JRE (version 8u131) on August 18, 2017. After either condition is met (new release becoming available or expiration date reached), the JRE will provide additional warnings and reminders to users to update to the newer version. For more information, see JRE Expiration Date.
Changes
security-libs/java.security
MD5 added to jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms Security property
This JDK release introduces a new restriction on how MD5 signed JAR files are verified. If the signed JAR file uses MD5, signature verification operations will ignore the signature and treat the JAR as if it were unsigned. This can potentially occur in the following types of applications that use signed JAR files:
MD5 added to jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms Security property
This JDK release introduces a new restriction on how MD5 signed JAR files are verified. If the signed JAR file uses MD5, signature verification operations will ignore the signature and treat the JAR as if it were unsigned. This can potentially occur in the following types of applications that use signed JAR files:
- Applets or Web Start Applications
- Standalone or Server Applications that are run with a SecurityManager enabled and are configured with a policy file that grants permissions based on the code signer(s) of the JAR file.
The list of disabled algorithms is controlled via the security property,jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms, in the java.security file. This property contains a list of disabled algorithms and key sizes for cryptographically signed JAR files.
To check if a weak algorithm or key was used to sign a JAR file, one can use the jarsigner binary that ships with this JDK. Running "jarsigner -verify" on a JAR file signed with a weak algorithm or key will print more information about the disabled algorithm or key.
For example, to check a JAR file named test.jar, use the following command:
jarsigner -verify test.jar
If the file in this example was signed with a weak signature algorithm like MD5withRSA, the following output would be displayed:
The jar will be treated as unsigned, because it is signed with a weak algorithm that is now disabled. Re-run jarsigner with the -verbose option for more details.
More details can be displayed by using the verbose option:
jarsigner -verify -verbose test.jar
The following output would be displayed:
- Signed by "CN=weak_signer"
Digest algorithm: MD5 (weak)
Signature algorithm: MD5withRSA (weak), 512-bit key (weak)
Timestamped by "CN=strong_tsa" on Mon Sep 26 08:59:39 CST 2016
Timestamp digest algorithm: SHA-256
Timestamp signature algorithm: SHA256withRSA, 2048-bit key
To address the issue, the JAR file will need to be re-signed with a stronger algorithm or key size. Alternatively, the restrictions can be reverted by removing the applicable weak algorithms or key sizes from the jdk.jar.disabledAlgorithms security property; however, this option is not recommended. Before re-signing affected JARs, the existing signature(s) should be removed from the JAR file. This can be done with the .zip utility, as follows:
zip -d test.jar 'META-INF/.SF' 'META-INF/.RSA' 'META-INF/*.DSA'
Please periodically check the Oracle JRE and JDK Cryptographic Roadmap athttp://java.com/cryptoroadmap for planned restrictions to signed JARs and other security components.
JDK-8171121 (not public)
core-libs/java.net
New system property to control caching for HTTP SPNEGO connection.
A new JDK implementation specific system property to control caching for HTTP SPNEGO (Negotiate/Kerberos) connections is introduced. Caching for HTTP SPNEGO connections remains enabled by default, so if the property is not explicitly specified, there will be no behavior change.
When connecting to an HTTP server that uses SPNEGO to negotiate authentication, and when connection and authentication with the server is successful, the authentication information will then be cached and reused for further connections to the same server. In addition, connecting to an HTTP server using SPNEGO usually involves keeping the underlying connection alive and reusing it for further requests to the same server. In some applications, it may be desirable to disable all caching for the HTTP SPNEGO (Negotiate/Kerberos) protocol in order to force requesting new authentication with each new request to the server.
With this change, we now provide a new system property that allows control of the caching policy for HTTP SPNEGO connections. If jdk.spnego.cache is defined and evaluates to false, then all caching will be disabled for HTTP SPNEGO connections. Setting this system property to false may, however, result in undesirable side effects:
New system property to control caching for HTTP SPNEGO connection.
A new JDK implementation specific system property to control caching for HTTP SPNEGO (Negotiate/Kerberos) connections is introduced. Caching for HTTP SPNEGO connections remains enabled by default, so if the property is not explicitly specified, there will be no behavior change.
When connecting to an HTTP server that uses SPNEGO to negotiate authentication, and when connection and authentication with the server is successful, the authentication information will then be cached and reused for further connections to the same server. In addition, connecting to an HTTP server using SPNEGO usually involves keeping the underlying connection alive and reusing it for further requests to the same server. In some applications, it may be desirable to disable all caching for the HTTP SPNEGO (Negotiate/Kerberos) protocol in order to force requesting new authentication with each new request to the server.
With this change, we now provide a new system property that allows control of the caching policy for HTTP SPNEGO connections. If jdk.spnego.cache is defined and evaluates to false, then all caching will be disabled for HTTP SPNEGO connections. Setting this system property to false may, however, result in undesirable side effects:
- Performance of HTTP SPNEGO connections may be severely impacted as the connection will need to be re-authenticated with each new request, requiring several communication exchanges with the server.
- Credentials will need to be obtained again for each new request, which, depending on whether transparent authentication is available or not, and depending on the global Authenticator implementation, may result in a popup asking the user for credentials for every new request.
JDK-8170814 (not public)
core-libs/java.net
New system property to control caching for HTTP NTLM connection.
A new JDK implementation specific system property to control caching for HTTP NTLM connection is introduced. Caching for HTTP NTLM connection remains enabled by default, so if the property is not explicitly specified, there will be no behavior change.
On some platforms, the HTTP NTLM implementation in the JDK can support transparent authentication, where the system user credentials are used at system level. When transparent authentication is not available or unsuccessful, the JDK only supports getting credentials from a global authenticator. If connection to the server is successful, the authentication information will then be cached and reused for further connections to the same server. In addition, connecting to an HTTP NTLM server usually involves keeping the underlying connection alive and reusing it for further requests to the same server. In some applications, it may be desirable to disable all caching for the HTTP NTLM protocol in order to force requesting new authentication with each new requests to the server.
With this change, we now provide a new system property that allows control of the caching policy for HTTP NTLM connections. If jdk.ntlm.cache is defined and evaluates to false, then all caching will be disabled for HTTP NTLM connections. Setting this system property to false may, however, result in undesirable side effects:
New system property to control caching for HTTP NTLM connection.
A new JDK implementation specific system property to control caching for HTTP NTLM connection is introduced. Caching for HTTP NTLM connection remains enabled by default, so if the property is not explicitly specified, there will be no behavior change.
On some platforms, the HTTP NTLM implementation in the JDK can support transparent authentication, where the system user credentials are used at system level. When transparent authentication is not available or unsuccessful, the JDK only supports getting credentials from a global authenticator. If connection to the server is successful, the authentication information will then be cached and reused for further connections to the same server. In addition, connecting to an HTTP NTLM server usually involves keeping the underlying connection alive and reusing it for further requests to the same server. In some applications, it may be desirable to disable all caching for the HTTP NTLM protocol in order to force requesting new authentication with each new requests to the server.
With this change, we now provide a new system property that allows control of the caching policy for HTTP NTLM connections. If jdk.ntlm.cache is defined and evaluates to false, then all caching will be disabled for HTTP NTLM connections. Setting this system property to false may, however, result in undesirable side effects:
- Performance of HTTP NTLM connections may be severely impacted as the connection will need to be re-authenticated with each new request, requiring several communication exchanges with the server.
- Credentials will need to be obtained again for each new request, which, depending on whether transparent authentication is available or not, and depending on the global Authenticator implementation, may result in a popup asking the user for credentials for every new request.
JDK-8163520 (not public)
tools/visualvm
New version of VisualVM
VisualVM 1.3.9 was released on October 4th, 2016 http://visualvm.github.io/relnotes.html and has been integrated into 8u131.
See JDK-8167485
New version of VisualVM
VisualVM 1.3.9 was released on October 4th, 2016 http://visualvm.github.io/relnotes.html and has been integrated into 8u131.
See JDK-8167485
Bug Fixes
The following are some of the notable bug fixes included in this release:
client-libs/java.awt
Introduced a new window ordering model
On the OS X platform, the AWT framework used native services to implement parent-child relationship for windows. That caused some negative visual effects especially in multi-monitor environments. To get rid of the disadvantages of such an approach, the new window ordering model, which is fully implemented at the JDK layer, was introduced. Its main principles are listed below:
Introduced a new window ordering model
On the OS X platform, the AWT framework used native services to implement parent-child relationship for windows. That caused some negative visual effects especially in multi-monitor environments. To get rid of the disadvantages of such an approach, the new window ordering model, which is fully implemented at the JDK layer, was introduced. Its main principles are listed below:
- A window should be placed above its nearest parent window.
- If a window has several child windows, all child windows should be located at the same layer and the window from the active window chain should be ordered above its siblings.
- Ordering should not be performed for a window that is in an iconified state or when the transition to an iconified state is in progress.
These rules are applied to every frame or dialog from the window hierarchy that contains the currently focused window.
See JDK-8169589
security-libs/javax.net.ssl
Correction of IllegalArgumentException from TLS handshake
A recent issue from the JDK-8173783 fix can cause issue for some TLS servers. The problem originates from an IllegalArgumentException thrown by the TLS handshaker code:
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: System property jdk.tls.namedGroups(null) contains no supported elliptic curves
The issue can arise when the server doesn't have elliptic curve cryptography support to handle an elliptic curve name extension field (if present). Users are advised to upgrade to this release. By default, JDK 7 Updates and later JDK families ship with the SunEC security provider which provides elliptic curve cryptography support. Those releases should not be impacted unless security providers are modified.
See JDK-8173783
Correction of IllegalArgumentException from TLS handshake
A recent issue from the JDK-8173783 fix can cause issue for some TLS servers. The problem originates from an IllegalArgumentException thrown by the TLS handshaker code:
java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: System property jdk.tls.namedGroups(null) contains no supported elliptic curves
The issue can arise when the server doesn't have elliptic curve cryptography support to handle an elliptic curve name extension field (if present). Users are advised to upgrade to this release. By default, JDK 7 Updates and later JDK families ship with the SunEC security provider which provides elliptic curve cryptography support. Those releases should not be impacted unless security providers are modified.
See JDK-8173783
This release also contains fixes for security vulnerabilities described in the Oracle Java SE Critical Patch Update Advisory. For a more complete list of the bug fixes included in this release, see theJDK 8u131 Bug Fixes page.
Installed!
- wong chee tat :)
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